Proxy re-encryption is a cryptographic primitive used to transform a ciphertext under one public key such that it becomes a ciphertext under another public key using a re-encryption key. Depending on the properties featured by a proxy re-encryption scheme, it can be applied to a variety of applications. In this paper, we target one such application of proxy re-encryption -access control in hierarchy, to highlight an important research gap in its design. We study how a proxy re-encryption scheme that is both unidirectional and transitive can be useful for enforcing hierarchical access control with constant computation and storage overhead on its users irrespective of the depth of the hierarchy. Also, we present improvements on the existing re-encryption schemes to make it applicable to hierarchical key assignment and achieve performance closer to that in case of a unidirectional transitive proxy re-encryption scheme.
INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is gaining importance as more and more enterprises are switching to cloud for providing storage and computing services to its users. To maintain confidentiality of the data, it is encrypted. A cloud customer willing to enforce cryptographic access control (Vimercati et al., 2010) uses proxy reencryption (Blaze et al., 1998) to delegate decryption rights of a data item to any other party. This delegation of decryption rights (or simply delegation) requires re-encryption to be done using a special key called re-encryption key (or delegation key). Anyone can use a re-encryption key rk A→B to transform message encrypted for A such that can be decrypted by B. The re-encryption procedure does not reveal anything about the underlying plaintext or secret keys A and B. First proposed by Blaze et al. (Blaze et al., 1998) , revisited by Dodis et al.(Dodis and Fazio, 2003) , the desirable properties of proxy re-encryption were first presented by Ateniese et al. (Ateniese et al., 2006) . The properties include unidirectionality, transitivity, collusion safety, proxy invisibility, key optimality, temporary delegation and non-transferability. Various applications of proxy re-encryption require different combinations of these properties to be satisfied. Consider an application scenario where cryptographic access control in a hierarchy of security classes is provided using key management (Atallah et al., 2009 ). The set of users is divided into a disjoint collection of classes depending on the security clearance of the users. The hierarchy of classes forms a POSET (partially ordered set) under the partial order . Here, C j C i means that users in a class C i have access to data items encrypted for all the classes C j in addition to the data items directly encrypted for users in C i . Proxy re-encryption can be applied for managing access in this scenario by assigning re-encryption keys rk i→ j to each edge in the access hierarchy as shown in Figure 1 . Suppose users in C 1 wish to access ciphertext CT 2 of class C 2 . Users in C 1 can get CT 2 re-encrypted using rk 2→1 . But if users in C 1 want to access ciphertext CT 6 , due to unavailability of reencryption key rk 6→1 , CT 6 must be first transformed into CT 2 using rk 6→2 and then into CT 1 using rk 2→1 .
In general, the number of re-encryptions required is at most equal to the depth of the hierarchy. Also, schemes that support repeated re-encryption and only in one direction i.e., unidirectional and multi-hop re-encryption schemes (Shao et al., 2011; Chandran et al., 2014) are computationally very costly to realize and require extremely costly operations for each reencryption. But if the re-encryption scheme is transitive and unidirectional, then given rk 6→2 and rk 2→1 , it is possible to derive rk 6→1 . So, it avoids repeated reencryptions and requires only one re-encryption followed by one decryption. However, we note that there is no proxy re-encryption scheme that satisfies both unidirectionality and transitivity. In this paper, we open an interesting problem of designing a unidirectional-transitive proxy reencryption scheme. Our claims are based on the existing security requirements and state-of-the art design of proxy re-encryption schemes. For this, we capture high level design goals in the form of functions. We also propose the ways by which existing reencryption schemes can be modified to obtain performance close to the case with unidirectional-transitive proxy re-encryption. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents system definitions for hierarchical access control. Section 3 defines a unidirectional and transitive proxy re-encryption scheme along with its security requirements. Section 4 discusses our mathematical claims regarding the possibility of design of a unidirectional-transitive proxy re-encryption.
ACCESS CONTROL IN HIERARCHY
We present a formal model for access control in hierarchy. This includes definitions of procedures involved and security definition.
System Model
Let C 1 ,C 2 , . . . ,C n be a disjoint partition (security classes or simply classes) of the set of users U in the system. Let S = {C 1 ,C 2 , . . . ,C n } be partially ordered by the binary relation . If C j C i , then users in class C j have the right to access information meant for users in class C i . However, the reverse is not allowed. We use following notations in context of access control in hierarchy:
• parent(C i )/ances(C i ) denotes the set of classes C j ∈ S such that C i C j and C j is one/more than one level higher in the hierarchy than C i .
• child(C i )/desc(C i ) denotes the set of classes C j ∈ S such that C j C i and C j is more than one/more than one level lower in the hierarchy than C i . All the users in a class C i share a class secret key, CSK i and the corresponding class encryption key CEK i is published. All these users in a security class C i communicate with each other through messages encrypted using a symmetric secret key K i . Users in a class C j may want to access data items encrypted for a class C i where C i C j . For this, symmetric secret key K i has to be obtained by users of C j . A class addition or deletion from the hierarchy may take place. There exists a central trusted Key Generation Center (KGC) which generates the CSK and CEK for every class.
Definitions
Any hierarchical key assignment scheme can be defined as a collection of the following algorithms: 1. Set: This algorithm takes security parameter as input and computes the public system parameters. 2. Gen: In this algorithm, each class C i is assigned CSK i to be kept secret by the class members and a CEK i which is made public. This phase also generates public parameters corresponding to the edges in the hierarchy tree which may be used for key derivation. 3. Derive: This procedure enables users of a class C j ∈ {ances(C i ) ∪ parent(C i )} to derive decryption key of class C i .
Security
Security definition for key management for hierarchy captures the inability of a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A to have a non-negligible advantage over the challenger C in the following game:
• Initiate: C executes Set and Gen and gives all the public parameters and CEK i to the adversary.
• Query-1: A can request K i for the set of corrupted security classes for number of times polynomial in the security parameter k.
• Challenge: When A decides that the query procedure is over, she can specify a target security
∀C i asked in the above query phase. C now picks a bit h randomly such that h ∈ R {0, 1} and sends a random output (other than the key) K i * if h = 0 and the actual key K i * if h = 1.
• Query-2: A can issue more queries for classes C j
• Guess: Now A outputs her best guess h ′ and A is declared winner of the game if h = h ′ .
A's advantage in the game above
In addition to the above security definition, hierarchical key management must also support forward and backward secrecy. Backward Secrecy requires that if a new security class C l joins in, the users in C l must not be able to obtain data encrypted for all the classes C k such that C k C l prior to C l 's joining. To maintain Forward Secrecy, a class C l ′ that leaves the system must not be able to access data encrypted for all classes C k such that C k C l ′ after C l ′ leaves.
UNIDIRECTIONAL AND TRANSITIVE PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION
A proxy re-encryption scheme uses a re-encryption key rk A→B for transformation of ciphertext under a public key pk A such that it becomes a ciphertext under pk B and is decrypted by sk B . While a unidirectional proxy re-encryption prevents delegation in reverse direction, transitivity makes it possible for anyone to derive a direct re-encryption key using various singlehop re-encryption keys.
Definition
We define a proxy re-encryption scheme which is same as in (Ateniese et al., 2006) except that it has an additional procedure for direct re-encryption key derivation. 
Security
We define security requirements for the proposed proxy re-encryption scheme against a PPT adversary (A) that tries to distinguish two second-level ciphertexts as under:
Set of key-pairs of the honest users as {(sk B , pk B )}, set of key-pairs of set of corrupted users as {(sk X , pk X )} and key-pair of the target user as (sk i * , pk i * ). The definition means that a colluding adversary is able to distinguish two direct ciphertexts despite the availability of all the re-encryption keys, with negligible advantage.
Hierarchical Key Assignment
We define hierarchical key assignment (Set, Gen and Derive) as an application of a unidirectional transitive proxy re-encryption scheme. (See Table 1 Table 1 : Operation of access control in hierarchy using unidirectional and transitive proxy re-encryption scheme.
HKA PRE procedures
such that C i ∈ child(C j ) are generated and assigned to the corresponding edges by ReKeyGen(CSK i ,CEK j ). ∀C i ∈ S. K i encrypted using Enc 2 (CEK i , K i ) to produce CT ′ i is published. 3. Derive: When any user from C j wishes to access K i of class C i , following two cases are possible: C i ∈ child(C j ): Re-encryption key rk i→ j should be available as a result of the procedure Gen defined above. For users in C j to access K i , anyone can compute ReEnc(rk i→ j ,CT ′ i ) to get CT j . This can be decrypted using Dec 1 (CSK j ,CT j ). C i ∈ desc(C j ): In this case, rk i→ j would not be available. The procedure Derive RK is used with all the one-hop re-encryption keys on the path from C i to C j to compute rk i→ j (see Figure 2) . This rk i→ j can now be used for reencryption as in the previous case (where C i ∈ child(C j )) to produce CT j . CT j can be decrypted as Dec 1 (CSK j ,CT j ) to obtain K i .
Dynamic Access Hierarchy
To preserve backward secrecy, K i and the individual key pair (CSK i ,CEK i ) for all classes C i such that
The new symmetric secret key K ′ i is now encrypted using Enc 2 (CEK ′ i , K ′ i ). As a result of changing the individual key pairs of every class C i ∈ {desc(C l ) ∪ child(C l )}, corresponding 
re-encryption keys rk i ′ → j where C j ∈ parent(C i ) are also updated using ReKeyGen(CSK i ,CEK j ). Similar procedure is followed in case a class is removed from the hierarchy to preserve forward secrecy.
Performance Analysis
Storage cost: As shown in Table 2 , users in C i have to store only one CSK i and one symmetric secret key K i irrespective of the depth d i of C i .
Computation cost: As can be seen in Table 1 , to derive symmetric secret key K i of any class C i ∈ {desc(C j ) ∪ child(C j )} it requires the users in class C j to perform only one decryption. In case of a change in the access hierarchy, total computation cost for a class C j equals that of one encryption and generation of |parent(C j )| re-encryption keys.
Security
Since K i is encrypted and re-encrypted using algorithms defined in Section 3.1, security of the hierarchical access control depends on security of the unidirectional transitive proxy re-encryption defined in Section 3.3.
DESIGNING DESIRED PROXY RE-ENCRYPTION SCHEME
So far, it has been discussed that using a unidirectional and transitive proxy re-encryption scheme for key management in hierarchy, we can achieve: 1. Constant key derivation cost for users of any class, 2. Constant storage overhead on the users, 3. Efficient forward an backward secrecy, 4. No repeated transformation of ciphertext. We note, however, that there is no proxy re-encryption scheme in the existing literature that is both unidirectional and transitive. We present claims that have the potential to establish that transitivity has to be compromised while achieving unidirectionality and vice versa. We also present improvements by which unidirectionality and transitivity can be "closely" imitated.
Assumptions
existence of a light-weight encryption scheme E that involves (at most) one modular exponentiation or one multiplication such that E(x,y) gives the encryption of y using x as the key. Decryption of this encryption can be done using another procedure D (x,E(x,y) ) to obtain y. Consider the same collection of public keys pk 1 , pk 2 , . . . , pk n with the sequence of reencryption keys being rk 1→2 , rk 2→3 , . . . , rk (n−1)→n . As has been discussed in the bottom-up approach, decryption key dk i can be obtained using secret key sk i+1 and rk i→(i+1) . Now if decryption key dk i−1 is encrypted using E(dk i , dk i−1 ) and stored as additional component of re-encryption key (as shown in Table 3 ) rk (i−1)→i , then using rk (i−1)→i , rk i→(i+1) and sk i+1 , one can obtain not only dk i but also dk i−1
. Therefore a direct reencryption key rk (i−1)→(i+1) can be derived using dk (i−1) and sk (i+1) . Note that in this process, only one secret key (sk i+1 ) is involved. So, participation of only one user is required. This would facilitate derivation of dk 1 using sk i alone in the general case where rk 1→2 , . . . , rk (n−1)→n and pk 1 , . . . , pk n are given as sequences of re-encryption keys and public keys respectively. Since this procedure requires chain of dependent computations for obtaining subsequent decryption keys, these computations cannot be outsourced. However, the direct re-encryption key obtained as a result of this process can be given to anyone to carry out re-encryption. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed an idea of using proxy re-encryption satisfying special properties for hierarchical key management. We observed that key derivation cost in hierarchy can be reduced to a constant (independent of depth) with all the computations to be done on re-encryption key level if a proxy re-encryption scheme is unidirectional and transitive. We note that there is no re-encryption scheme in literature that is both unidirectional and transitive. This leads us to prove the concrete requirements for such a re-encryption scheme. We claim that given the stateof-the-art design of proxy re-encryption scheme, both unidirectionality and transitivity cannot be achieved simultaneously. We also suggest improvements on the existing re-encryption schemes to achieve efficiency comparable to the case with transitive-unidirectional proxy re-encryption.
